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Abstract 
The aim of the paper is to identify the impact of the currency transaction tax on the foreign exchange structure and 
thus its impact on exchange rate volatility. In a noise trading framework a la Jeanne and Rose (2002), we explain that 
the exchange rate volatility depends on fundamentals volatility and extra volatility due to the behaviour of noise 
traders. The exchange rate volatility is lower after introducing a Currency Transaction Tax as it increases the entry 
cost of noise traders and influences the range of possible equilibria. While there are multiple equilibria of exchange rate 
volatility without Currency Tax, there are only two aggregate exchange rate volatility corner equilibria after introducing 
a CTT. One of them is a low exchange rate volatility equilibrium. Moreover, we prove analytically the existence of an 
optimal tax rate for which the exchange rate volatility depends solely on fundamentals variance. In this case, few noise 
traders enter the market and there is consequently a low excess volatility. 
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     1 Introduction
Government intervention through ﬁnancial transaction taxes is an old idea. Keynes already
suggested it in the General Theory in 1936. But the idea is mainly associated with the name
of Tobin who put it in concrete terms in 1972 during his Janeways Lectures. More recently
Stiglitz (1989) and Summers/Summers (1989) also seize about the issue. Tobin (1972, 1974,
1978, 1996) suggested the introduction of a small transaction Tax (1% originally) on each
conversion of domestic currency into any foreign currency, the primary aim of the Currency
Transaction Tax (CTT) is indeed to increase monetary autonomy and decrease exchange rate
volatility. The tax would, in theory, break-up the link between domestic and foreign interest
rate and discourage destabilizing speculation and irrationnaly market traders activity, leading
to higher market eﬃciency and thus exchange rate stability.
Except the major contribution of Haq, Kaul and Krunberg (1996) and the seminal paper
of Frankel (1996), this topic was more often than not ideologically considered so that there
are only few robust analysis. In overall however, those contributions have not reached a
consensus on the likely eﬀects of such a tax on exchange rate volatility. Moreover, while the
approach of Frankel (1996) has been very fruitful, it still possesses a number of drawbacks:
especially the Frankel’s model is a macro monetary model of exchange rate determination
with no micro speciﬁcation of the trader’s portfolio optimization. The model of Frankel holds
only for the covered interest parity condition and thus the expectations of the traders are no
taken into account1.
In this paper, we consider the eﬀects of a CTT on the exchange rate volatility by using and
extending the macro-microstructure framework of Jeanne and Rose (2002). This work is thus
in line with Xu (2005) who built a DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) Model
based on the Jeanne and Rose (2002) framework in which a ﬁnancial tax is introduced2. The
benchmark model of Jeanne and Rose is very interesting because it mixes elements from the
macroeconomic theory of exchange rate determination and from the noise trading approach
of asset price volatility. Therefore, the aggregate exchange rate volatility can be expressed as
a function of fundamental (macro) volatility and extra volatility (due to the noise trading).
We show that CTT increases the entry cost of noise traders, CTT makes decrease the
beneﬁt of entering the foreign exchange market for the noise traders and therefore leads to
lower extra volatility in exchange rate. Furthermore, CTT introduction inﬂuences the range
of possible equilibria. After introducing a CTT, there are only two aggregate exchange rate
volatility corner equilibria. One equilibrium with high aggregate exchange rate volatility
if the fundamental volatility is high and one equilibrium with low aggregate exchange rate
volatility if fundamental volatility is low to moderate. Contrary to the Jeanne and Rose
(2002) framework, after introducing a CTT, the multiple equilibria problem for intermediate
levels of fundamental volatility disappears.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. After presenting the model foundations in
section 2, we next present the main results in section 3 and section 4 points out the concluding
remarks.
1Bird and Rajan (2001) have extended the model of Frankel (1996) adding some expectations only
in the interest parity condition, not in the trading behaviour.
2Since the writting of this article, an other study in line with the Jeanne and Rose (2002) model
and considering the CTT eﬀects on exchange rate volatility has been developed by Shi and Xu (2009,
forthcoming at Canadian Journal of Economics).
12 Model foundations
Following Jeanne and Rose (2002), our theoretical baseline melts two separate branches of
exchange rate theory: the macroeconomic theory of exchange rate determination (2.1) and
the noise trading approach to ﬁnancial markets (2.2). Our contribution consists in adding a
CTT to study its impact on exchange rates determination.
2.1 Macroeconomic side: a monetary model
On the macroeconomic side, we used the conventional monetary model (see Mussa (1976,
1979) and Frenkel (1976) and see Neely and Sarno (2002) for a survey).
We consider two countries ”‘domestic”’ and ”‘foreign”’ and assume that the domestic coun-
try is a small open economy (periphery) and the foreign country is a developed country which
is the core of the international ﬁnancial system. Following Jeanne and Rose (2002, see equa-
tions (1) to (4)), prices are assumed to be perfectly ﬂexible and purchasing power parity is
only satiﬁed in average: thus the log of the foreign exchange rate (e) is the ratio of prices
levels and a normal shock (ǫt), so that:
et = (mt − mt∗) + α(it − i∗t) + ǫt (1)
where α is a parameter, m is the natural logarithm of the money stock and i is the natural
logarithm of the interest rate. The foreign country is denoted with an asterisk and all foreign
variables are assumed to be in a constant steady state in order to put the emphasize on the
small domestic country. Foreign price level is constant, then all foreign variables are expressed
in real terms.
Two diﬀerent kinds of bonds are assumed: the domestic bonds are issued by the domes-
tic country in local currency (Peso as in Jeanne and Rose (2002)) and foreign bonds are
denominated in foreign currency (in dollars).
2.2 Microeconomic side: trading behavior
On the microeconomic side, our model incorporates microstructural mechanisms (see Lyons
(2001) about microstructure theory). Consider that traders are modelled as overlapping
generations of investors. They live for two periods in a mean-variance ` a la Markowitz (1952)
framework and allocate their endowment between a domestic risky bond and a foreign risky
less bond. At each period t, the new born traders j receive an endowment W denominated in
dollars and form a continuum. At t, each trader knows the nominal interest rates and decides
wether or not to enter the Peso bond (and consequently the foreign exchange) market. We
assume that the entry decision is made at time t − 1, i.e. before the shocks are revealed.
According to Jeanne and Rose (2002), there are two kinds of traders : NI informed traders
(j = 1,...,NI) and NN noise traders NN(j = NI + 1,...,N). They have the same endow-
ments, they are both risk adverse, but they are heterogeneous according to their expectations
of exchange rate and excess return: informed traders are knowledgeable about the economic
fundamentals, can process information costlessly and make rational expectations about the
future; non informed traders or so called noise traders have imperfect knowledge of fundamen-
tals determinants of exchange rate. Thus, following Jeanne and Rose (2002), noise traders
are restricted to unbiased signals:
• informed traders j = I have rational expectations about both expected and variance
of the excess return
2δt+1 = it − (et+1 − et) − i∗
2.3 Currency Transaction Tax introduction
Assume that a Currency Tax is introduced for all traders. In this case, the constraint (8’)
in the previous system should be substituted by a new one (8”):
W
j
t+1 = (1 + i∗)W + φ((B
j∗τ
t δt+1 − τX) − k) (8”)
Note that X is the taxed part of the excess return: X = γδ where γ is a coeﬃcient of ﬁscal
avoidance close to 1. In addition, the CTT rate τ is given as: 0 < τ < 1. Besides, considering
currency taxes literature, the tax rate would be at a very low level (0.1% for instance) so as
to avoid drowning the transaction costs on the Forex which are currently at very low level.
3 Results
Equilibrium
An equilibrium in the model of Jeanne and Rose (2002) consists of a stochastic process for
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t satisﬁes the entry condition (7), B
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solution of the portfolio maximization problem and the market clearing condition for domestic






t , where B is the constant supply of Peso bonds). Following Jeanne
and Rose (2002), we solve the model by a ”‘guess and veriﬁy”’ technique, ﬁrst assuming the
shocks as i.i.d. distributed, then checking that those properties are satisﬁed.
The analysis is executed in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, the demand for foreign bonds is
computed at each period, before and after the introduction of a CTT. Considering ﬁrst the
number of noise traders as exogenous (i.e. there is no entry condition), we can deduce the
optimal demand for bonds denominated in Peso (B
j∗τ
t ), the average risk premium (δ) and the
variance of exchange rate (V ar(et)). On this basis, the number of noise trader is endogenized
in the second step.
Step 1: Exogenous number of noise traders
First, we can get the optimal demand for Peso bond by an individual trader by maximizing
the mean-variance objective function (8). Next, using market clearing condition in the Peso
bond market, we can derive the expression of the average risk premium and consequently solve
for the equilibrium exchange rate and ﬁnally its variance (i.e. the volatility). By resolving
for the model anew after introducing a CTT, the following results are derived:
1) In line with Jeanne and Rose (2002), we show that the exchange rate volatility4 is
increasing in the fundamental volatility (money demand and prices denoted V ar(m+ǫ)) and









4See the equation (20) in the appendix.
4In others words, the aggregate exchange rate volatility (V ar(et)) consists in a fundamental
volatility (in the numerator) and in an extra volatility due to the noise traders n. Given
the fundamental volatility, the minimal exchange rate variance is thus reached when there is
zero noise traders entering the market and conversely the maximal exchange rate volatility
is reached when the number of noise traders (n) is maximum. An exogenous increase in the
number of noise traders increases unambiguously the variance of the exchange rate and tends
to raise the risk premium. However5, increasing the number of noise traders leads also to




Thus, the impact of noise traders in equilibrium is non monotonic. The noise traders have
indeed two counter-acting roles in the model: they both create and share risk at the same
time.
2) Our ﬁrst main result is that the exchange rate volatiliy is lower after introducing a CTT
when the number of noise traders is exogenous:




















Proposition 1. The CTT decreases the exchange rate volatility level when the number of
noise traders is given. See Proof 1 in appendix.
So, this result is in line with of Tobin conjectures (1978, 1996) and in accordance with the
main experimental (or simulation based) studies like Ehrenstein et al. (2005), Westerhoﬀ and
Dieci (2006), Kaiser et al. (2006) and Bianconi et al. (2007) but it opposes to Hanke et al.
(2007).
Step 2: Endogenous number of noise traders
Now, we consider that the entry decision of the noise trader is endogenized. As in step 1,
an equilibrium in the model is ﬁrst computed without CTT and then a CTT is introduced.
Some remarks to address:
1) In line with Jeanne and Rose (2002) and Chen (2007), we note that the informed traders
always enter the domestic bond market since they bear no entry costs, while noise traders
enter the market only if the gross beneﬁt of entry exceeds their entry cost. We establish
that, when they enter the domestic bond market, the beneﬁt of entry for noise traders is an
increasing function with the expected unconditionnal mean of the excess return (i.e. the risk
premium) and decreasing with the adverse risk coeﬃcient and the exchange rate variance
(see (23) in proposition 2).
However, as we seen above, in equilibrium, both the risk premium and variance of the
exchange rate are functions of the number of noise traders. So, we have a ciruclarity process:
n = f(δ,V ar(e)) with δ = g(n) and var(e) = h(n).
2) This circularity process generates multiple equilibria with a range of entry by noise traders
as derived in the Corollary 1. Since the variance of exchange rate is a monotonic function
of the number of noise traders, there are a range of excess volatility equilibria with respect
to the level of fundamental variance:
• First, low fundamental variance
In this context, we show that an unique stable low exchange rate volatility equilibrium
emerges in which no noise traders enter the Peso bond market.
5See equation (16) in the appendix.
5• Second, high fundamental variance
In this context, we derive a stable high exchange rate volatility equilibrium and a high num-
ber of noise traders which are attracted by a high risk premium they generated themselves.
• Third, intermediate levels of fundamental variance
There exist multiple equilibria (with low to high entry by noise traders and low to high
aggregate exchange rate volatility). This class of equilibrium is at the heart of the study of
Jeanne and Rose (2002), because in such a context their model can generate diﬀerent levels of
aggregate exchange rate volatility for the same level of macroeconomic volatility. The excess
variance is indeed a function of the number of noise traders.
3) After introducing a CTT, there is some evidence that the entry beneﬁt for noise traders
always decreases (see Proposition 2) and thus the number of noise traders entering the
market follows the same pattern.
4) Based on Proposition 2, we get the main result of our analysis. When a CTT is introduced,
we get two class of stable corner equilibria6: i) a unique stable low equilibrium of aggregate
exchange rate volatility with a low level of fundamental variance and, ii) a unique high
aggregate exchange rate volatility equilibrium with a high level of fundamental variance.
But, and this is the more interesting result of our analysis, considering the magnitude of the
decline of the entry beneﬁt caused by the tax rate, there is only a unique stable low equilibrium
for intermediate levels of fundamental variance. This result is opposed to the Jeanne and
Rose (2002) results where there exist a multiple equilibria situation for intermediate levels of
fundamental variance. The following Proposition 3 can thus be derived.
Proposition 3. When a low level CTT is introduced, there exist a unique stable equilibrium
for intermediate levels of fundamental variance. In this case, few noise traders enter the
market and there is consequently a low excess volatility. See Proof 3 in appendix.
This analytical result can be illustrated by some simulation exercise (see ﬁgure 1). The set
of simulation in line with Jeanne and Rose (2002) study except for the introduction of a 0.1%
CTT rate. It emerges that the new noise trader j enters the market only if the number of
noise traders already in the Peso bond market is low (lower than 0.2% in our simulation).
insert ﬁgure 1
Investigating the gross beneﬁt curve (GNB) with high and very high levels of tax rate (1%
to 10%), we get the result that no noise trader is willing to enter in the foreign exchange
market, because the beneﬁt curve is always under the cost curve (see ﬁgure 1 in the left
setting). In an intuitive manner, the more higher the tax rate is, the more lower the number
of noise traders entering the market is.
Overall, considering the Proposition 3 and our simulation exercise, there is some evidence
that there are only two unique stable equilibria when a CTT is introduced: one with a low
level of aggregate exchange rate volatility when the fundamental volatility is low to high;
one with high aggregate exchange rate volatility for high levels of fundamental variance. The
CTT introduction inﬂuences the range of possible exchange rate equilibria and eliminates the
problem of multiple equilibria for intermediate levels of fundamental volatility.
6Stable ”‘corner equilibrium”’ means that there is zero (or respectively a maximum number of)
noise traders entering the market
6The ﬁgure 2 summarizes the eﬀects of a CTT on the aggregate exchange rate volatility
equilibria. It points out the multiple equilibria generated by the model without CTT for
intermediate levels of fundamental variance (in the middle of the left setting). Nevertheless,
after introducing a CTT (in the right setting), there is only two unique corner equilibria: for
low to moderate level of fundamental variance, the exchange rate volatility stands always at
low level. On the contrary, for high level of fundamental variance, the aggregate exchange
rate variance remains at high level.
insert ﬁgure 2
5) Our simulations show that the GNB function move downward when the tax rate is
increased. We indeed show in Propostion 4 that the GNB function is decreasing in the tax
rate.
We can ﬁnally analytically prove the existence of an optimal low level tax rate for which
the marginal beneﬁt is ever lower than the entry cost as underlined by the Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. There is an optimal CTT rate τ∗ for which the marginal beneﬁt level,
GNBτ, is always smaller than the entry cost k. In this case, no noise trader enters the foreign
exchange market. Therefore, the aggregate volatility is solely a function of the fundamental
volatility. See Proof 4 in appendix.
The optimal tax rate is thus an increasing function of the entry cost (k), the supply of bonds















In other words, the higher the entry cost, the amount invested and the number of noise
traders aldready in the market are, the higher the optimal tax rate should be to unseat the
noise traders. In this case, there is no more noise traders in the Peso bond market and since
the excess (contrary to fundamental) volatility is a function of the number of noise traders,
there is only an unique low stable exchange rate volatility equilibrum for low to intermediate
fundamental variance.
4 Concluding remarks
A Currency Transaction Tax changes the structure of the foreign exchange market by crowd-
ing out the noise traders, whatever their types. Noise traders can be speculators or not,
short termists or not. This property leads to diminish excess volatility and in ﬁne dampens
the aggregate volatility. All in all, the CTT inﬂuences the range of possible exchange rate
equilibria. The introduction of a CTT in the Jeanne and Rose framework (2002) corrects for
the multiple equilibria problem for moderate levels of fundamental volatility. Indeed, in such
a context, with CTT there is a unique equilibrium with few noise traders.
Moreover, we derive an optimal level of tax rate for which zero noise traders enter the
market. The excess volatility is thus at its minimum. The CTT indeed decreases the excess
return and consequently the risk premium that noise traders create when they trade. In a
sense, our study is in line with Summers and Summers (1989), Griﬃth Jones (1996), Frankel
(1996) and Arestis and Sawyer (1997) among others, who consider Transaction Taxes as a
mean to diminish the mimetic behaviors of traders in order to enhance the ﬁnancial stability.
75 Appendix
We will show how to obtain the results outlined in Section 3.
Step 1 Results.
Proposition 1. The CTT decreases the exchange rate volatility when the number of noise
traders is given.
Proof 1.
Assuming that the risk premium δt is normally distributed, we get the optimal demand for
domestic Peso bonds by each individual trader by maximizing the problem (8).
The mean-variance function is quadratic and thus concave. Given the strict positivity of
the bond demand, B
j∗
t is a point which achieves its maximum.













We can get the following lemma in accordance with Jeanne and Rose (2002).
Lemma 1. The optimal demand for bonds is increasing with the risk premium but decreasing
with the exchange rate volatility and the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion.
We now introduce a CTT and maximize (8’) under (8”) constraint.
We can derive the ﬁrst order condition:
E
j








t (X) = 0. (10)






t (δt+1) − τX
aV ar
j




Assuming that the excess return, the exchange rate variance and the taxed part of the risk
premium are equal to the same constant, that is V ar(δt+1) = V ar(et+1) = V ar(X), the






t (δt+1) − τX
aV ar
j
t (et+1)(1 − τ2)
. (12)
Lemma 1’. In an intuitive manner, the demand for Peso bonds after introduced the CTT
is lower than before introducing the CTT.













t (δt+1) − τX
aV ar
j
t (et+1)(1 − τ2)
. (13)
The sign of (14) is positive if τ < X
E
j
t(δt+1), that is the demand for Peso bonds decreases
after introducing a CTT. Hence, given the strict following condition τ < 1, the sign of (14)
is always positive.
7Note that all variables computed after introducing a CTT are expanded with τ.
8Considering lemma 1 and lemma 1’, we can solve for the average risk premium and the
variance of exchange rate, before and after introducing a CTT as follows:
















Rearranging yields the market clearing condition:
B =
Et (δt+1) + (1 − NI)νt
aV art (δt+1)
. (15)
Applying the same scheme given (12) and assuming that V ar(δt+1) = V ar(et+1), we can
deduce the market clearing condition after introducing a CTT:
B
τ =
Et (δt+1) + (1 − NI)νt − τX
aV art (δt+1) − aτ2V art (X)
. (16)
















Next, following the ”‘Guess and Verify”’ technique and assuming that the domestic supply
mt, follows a iid normal process centered on m, in accordance with Jeanne and Rose (2002),
we get the volatility expressions8.
Assuming that V ar
j
t (δt+1) = V ar
j
t (et+1) and9 √
λ <
(1+α)NI
αn ,by combining (9), (16), (17)
and rearranging, we get the variance of exchange rate:
V ar(et) =
V ar(m + ǫ)




















to ensure the exchange
rate volatility is positive for all n, we next turn the variance of exchange rate with CTT:
V arτ (et) =
V ar(m + ǫ)
￿















































8The integral proof will be provided upon request.
9The intuition behind this follows the fact that we assume only positive exchange rate variance.
9It follows that:
ατ (NI + n)(1 − τ)+I
NI
> 0. (22)
Therefore, given the positive signs of all parameters (α,τ,NI,n), the preceding condition
is always satisﬁed. This implies that the exchange rate volatiliy is always minimal after
introducing a CTT when the number of noise traders is exogenous.
Step 2 Results.
Proposition 2. The entry beneﬁt of noise traders always decreases after introducing a
CTT.
Proof 2.
Contrary to the informed traders, the noise traders decide wether or not to enter the market
by comparing the entry cost and her gross beneﬁt of entry, that is GNB(δ,V ar(e)) ≥ k.
Combinig (7) and (8) and assuming that the entry costs does not aﬀect the optimal demand














− 2δτX + τX2
2aV ar(e)(1 − τ2)
. (24)
The CTT can reduce the entry of noise traders if the diﬀerence between (24) and (25) is
positive, that is:
2E (δt+1)τX − (τX)
2 − τE (δt+1)
2
2aV ar(et+1)(1 − τ2)
> 0. (25)
Since a > 0 and V ar(et+1) > 0, the denominator of (26) is > 0 when τ < 1. Seeing that
the tax rate is always smaller than 1, the denominator is always positive.
From (24), it is thus easy to show that the model generate multiple equilibria as denoted
by the Corollary 1.
Corollary 110. For intermediate levels of fundamental variance, there exist multiple equi-
libria with a range of entry by noise traders.



















There are consequently more than one interception of GNB and k. See also the ﬁgure 1 in
the left setting.
Proposition 3. When a low level CTT is introduced, there exist an unique equilibrium
with a few number of noise traders entering the market for intermediate levels of fundamental
variance and a low excess volatility.
10See also Chen (2007) who used the Jeanne and Rose model (2002).
10Proof 3.
Considering the Corollary 1, we compute the beneﬁt entry function with CTT by substitut-
ing the risk premium (19) and the volatility (21) in the entry beneﬁt (25), we get :
GNBτ =
￿




































It is possible to approximate (28) by employing second-order Taylor series expansion. By























Hence, diﬀerentiating GNBTayl with respect to n and collecting to τ, we get:
(−Xλα2n2 − 2XNλα2n − 2XN2α2 + 2XaV ar(m + ǫ)BN2 − XN2)τ
| {z }
≈0
−aV ar(m + ǫ)N2
| {z }
<0




Since τ is near zero and all parameters are positive, (30) is negative. The GNB function is
thus purely decreasing in n. Therefore, a low CTT may end up with a unique beneﬁt function
equilibrium11
Proposition 4. There is an optimal CTT rate τ∗ for which the benﬁt marginal level, GNBτ,
is always smaller than the cost of entry k. In this case, no noise trader enters the foreign
exchange market. Therefore, the aggregate volatility is solely a function of the fundamental
volatility.
Proof 4.
We can diﬀerentiate GNBTayl with respect to the tax rate τ:
(X (Z − 2aV ar(m + ǫ))/(N + n))
2aV ar(m + ǫ)
. (30)
Note that the denominator of (31) is always positive and the numerator is negative if
2aV ar(m + ǫ)BN2 + λ(αn)
2 > N2 ￿
1 + 2α2￿
.
Considering the parameters, these conditions are satisﬁed and the beneﬁt function is positive
and thus decreasing in low levels of tax rate.
11The same result can be derived by employing a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion: in this case, the
derivative we get is − B
(N+n)2.
11Finally, we can compute the optimal tax rate for which the entry beneﬁt is always below
the entry cost:
GNB − k < 0. (31)
By taking (31) and substituting out τ, we can thus compute the optimal level tax rate for





2 + α + α2) +
h
(n2k)((2λ − 4)α2−4α−2)+(aV ar(m+ǫ)B
2i
N2
I + 2kα2λ(2NIn3 + n4)
4B(NI + n − 1)(( 1




The optimal tax rate is thus an increasing function with the entry cost (k), the supply of
bonds (B), the amount taxed part (X) and the number of noise traders (n).
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